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INTRODUCTION 
This brief, as is appropriate and required, will address only Cross-Appellants' reply to the 
cross-appeal issues argued in Appellants' Reply Brief. Cross-Appellants will confine their reply 
arguments herein specifically addressing only the cross-appeal punitive damage issues set forth on 
pages 29 through 40 of Appellants' Reply Brief. The Weinsteins stand by their prior arguments on 
all other issues not directly related to their cross-appeal as addressed herein. 
ARGUMENT 
On pages 29 through 40 of their Reply Brief, Appellants/Cross-Respondents ("Defendants") 
specifically address Respondents/Cross-Appellants' ("Weinsteins") cross-appeal. In this brief, 
Weinsteins will address and reply to Defendants' cross-appeal arguments in the order set forth in 
Defendants' Reply Brief. As background and foundation, Weinsteins ask this Court to recall the 
Statement of Fact and Argument in Weinsteins' initial brief to this Court. 
Weinsteins take strong issue with the Defendants' ongoing efforts to lead this Court astray on 
the true facts of this case. Defendants' gross misstatements of the facts are nothing new, however. 
Defendants first used that tactic with the Weinsteins, then with the trial court in pre-trial motions, 
then with the jury, and again with the trial court in post-trial motions, all to no avail. To this point, 
nobody has bought into Defendants' spin, and this Court should not now do so. Defendants' 
continuing factual misrepresentations demonstrate the degree of deceit and reprehensibility these 
companies will engage in to serve their own financial interests at the expense of their first-party 
insureds who paid money to simply buy protection. The true facts cannot be brushed aside in 
analyzing the punitive damage issues. 
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Defendants' specific attack on punitive damages, the remittitur vf which is subject of 
Weinsteins' cross-appeal, begins at page 29, and are addressed in order, as follows: 
1. Weinsteins' Bad Faith Claim Indeed Accrued Before July 1,2003. 
Defendants' arguments in this section of their Reply Brief grossly misstate the facts and are 
perhaps the best example of the Defendants' lack of credibility across the board. Weinsteins do not, 
as argued by Defendants, "concede that their complaint did not allege any acts of bad faith relating to 
the UM coverage until after July 1,2003." To the contrary, the initial Complaint and all amended 
versions asserted the Defendants' bad faith and breach of the obligation to pay policy benefits. With 
no basis Defendants simply assert that no UM benefits even accrued to Weinsteins until after 
Defendants' Med Pay benefits were used up (in this case after a long delay). However, Defendants' 
unilateral internal policy and practice to first exhaust Med Pay benefits before reviewing or paying 
undisputed UM damages (which in this case far exceeded Med Pay coverage) cannot bootstrap them 
into their unfounded position that no UM benefits accrued until after Med Pay benefits were 
exhausted. 
Perhaps Defendants' most blatant misstatements of the facts are set forth on page 30 of their 
Reply Briec where they assert nine (9) specific arguments that Weinsteins "cited no trial evidence," 
and state "unsupported contentions," or rely only on "scant evidence" showing that the UM claim 
arose before July 1,2003. Defendants' very allegations are outrageous and reprehensible because the 
evidence is clear and undisputed. As noted in Weinsteins' initial brief, the Defendants' own claim 
records (Exhibits 45,46, 52-54, 60, 64, 67,73-75) conclusively show that Defendants themselves 
acknowledged full UM coverage and liability from the very outset and that all elements of a UM 
cIaim accrued long before July 1, 2003. Defendants' incredible assertions that "no evidence" 
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supports Weinsteins' showing that UM bad faith accrued before July 1,2003, are preposterous and 
outrageous. Although the Defendants continue to assert that Weinsteins' facts are "without 
evidence," this Court, like the trial court and jury, cannot overlook what Defendants' own records 
prove. The evidence is solid on each of the nine (9) specific attacks Defendants make on page 3 1 of 
their Reply Brief, and Weinsteins ask this Court to review the clear evidence contradicting each of 
Defendants' nine (9) attacks, considering: 
1. Defendants' insurance contract (the "Policy") is entirely silent on 
differentiating any timing or liability overlap of Med Pay and UM coverage, 
or indicating that UM coverage benefits do not accrue until after Med Pay 
benefits are exhausted. Exhibits 1-37. 
2. Defendants' JR adjusters in fact opened a UM claim file the day after the 
accident, acknowledging 100% UM liability on the claim. Soon thereafter 
the UM claim value was reserved in excess of the combined Med Pay 
benefits. Thereafter and prior to July 1, 2003, those determinations were 
reaffirmed as the UM claim file was periodically reviewed. Exhibits 45,46, 
52,53,60 and 73. 
3. Defendants' their Med Pay file in February 2003. At that time UM 
liability remained undisputed, and none of Weinsteins' medical expenses had 
been paid. Exhibits 69,70,71,73,74, The UM claim file remained opened 
from the day after the accident at least until the time suit was filed in 2004. 
Exhibits 45,46,60,73,75,78, 95-96,260,262,268 and 269. 
4. The UM claim was acknowledged and valued far in excess of the Med Pay 
limits long before July 1,2003, based on substantial evidence in the UM file 
that damages had accrued before July 1,2003. Exhibits 60,73,75. 
5. How can Defendants, with a straight face, in good conscience and in good 
faith, argue that there is "no evidence" that Defendants' UM claim 
department required medical authorizations from Weinstein in December 
2002, in light of Exhibits 61 and 63? In fact, the UM claim department 
requested authorizations on three occasions! Exhibits 61, 63, 78-81, 
94,114-116. 
6. Defendants indeed completely delayed any efforts to properly investigate, 
evaluate or pay Weinsteins' claim. Defendants' own UM claim files 
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(Exhibits 78, 106, 262, 265, 267) show that they did not investigate or 
evaluate the UM claim file for payment of benefits until June 2004 at the 
earliest. 
7. Prior to July 1,2003, Defendants' records acknowledge that Sarah Weinstein 
had endured pain and surgery, and missed school. Exhibits 73, 75. This 
evidence, along with the unpaid undisputed medical bills, demonstrates that 
damages accrued before July 1,2003, and that UM benefits for special and 
general damages existed before that date. 
8. Medical bills had indeed accrued, and were unpaid, long before July I, 2003. 
Exhibits 55-56,57-58,62,64,65,67,73,75,76. Despite thoserecords, with 
no factual or legal basis Defendants specifically argue that no UM benefits 
could even accrue until all Med Pay benefits were first exhausted. That 
position simply ignores that there is no Policy language remotely establishing 
such a benefit payment sequence, and that their own UM file documents 
acknowledge UM liability at the outset, without regard to Med Pay coverage 
provisions. Further, even after receiving notice of Weinsteins' UM claim 
and then the initial medical authorization in early December 2002, 
Defendants failed completely in their duties to investigate the medical bills 
and files. 
9. Defendants' UM adjusters were in fact aware of Weinsteins' financial 
hardships before July 1,2003. In addition to mere common sense, this Court 
need only review Exhibits 64 and 67 to see that the Defendants had actual 
knowledge that their refusal to pay was causing the Weinsteins hardship. 
Contrary to Defendants' ridiculous arguments on these nine (9) points, the facts in this case 
(largely evidenced by the Defendants' own internal documents) indeed substantiate that Weinsteins' 
bad faith claim under the Policy's UM coverage accrued prior to July 1,2003. Each of Defendants' 
nine (9) specific arguments are nullified by the facts 
2. Defendants' Corporate Ratifleation. 
The uncontroverted evidence shows Defendants' corporate ratification of their UM claims 
department's conduct in handling Weinsteins' claim. The trial court did not err in refusing to give an 
instruction on this issue. 
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& evidence at trial indicated that the Defendants' UM conduct in any way was not in full 
conformance with "company policy." Rather, Defendants' fundamental defense in this case was 
based on a company policy to pay nothing (even undisputed amounts) until the insured was finally 
ready to settle the entire claim. 
Defendants falsely argue that the "only" evidence of corporate ratification in this case was a 
UM adjuster's testimony that she saw "nothing wrong with the way this claim was handled." 
Appellants' Reply Brief at 33. However, Defendants' own claim file shows much more. On 
November 1 1 and November 18,2003, the UM claim supervisor in charge noted that the handling of 
Weinsteins' claim was "properly directed." Exhibits 95-96 and 112. When those determinations 
were made, that claim file included Exhibits 38-1 11 (most notably Exhibits 78 and 106 describing 
Defendants' "company policy" not to pay any UM benefits until "the end," and Exhibits 83-84 
making specific false statements to Weinsteins' medical providers that all policy benefits were 
"exhausted"). 
Beyond that specific evidence, there is additional proof that Defendants' officers or directors 
ratified or endorsed the way this claim (and all UM claims) were handled: 
- Defendants (who have always appeared and defended as corporations) 
made no effort to produce any evidence or argument that this claim was either 
handled contraw to company policy, or that the company's UM claim policy was to 
process UM claims any differently; and, 
- Defendants (appearing and defending as corporations) have 
continuously asserted that the conduct of their UM department in refusing and 
delaying any payment until one final settlement was entirely appropriate both under 
the Policy and under Idaho law. 
Defendants' conduct and acknowledged corporate policy of refusing to pay undisputed UM 
benefits until one final payment at "the end" only when its first-party insured is finally "ready" to 
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settle everything, is the expressed ratified and endorsed policy and practice of the corporations 
themselves. That policy is far beyond some simple ratification or endorsement by the officers 
andor directors. 
3. D,efendants' Conduct Was Indeed Unconscionable. 
The only rational way to characterize Defendants' conduct is oppressive, unconscionable and 
outrageous. Defendants' ongoing arguments attempting to justifying their conduct are 
unconscionable and outrageous. 
The mere fact the Defendants' paid trial expert testified that Defendants "properly 
addressed" Weinsteins' claim does not make that a fact. The jury rightfully concluded after hearing 
all of the evidence (notwithstanding Defendants' expert testimony otherwise) that in fact 
Defendants' conduct was entirely inexcusable. 
Defendants' arguments (at pages 34 and 35 of their Reply Brief) in and of themselves 
demonstrate the cavalier, reckless, unconscionable and outrageous treatment of Weinsteins and all 
Defendants' UM Idaho insureds. For example, Defendants astonishingly assert (at page 34) that 
Weinsteins cite "no evidence" that they made statements to Weinsteins' medical creditors that 
insurance benefits were "exhausted." Defendants' argument is preposterous. When Defendants 
made those representations Weinsteins' total Policy benefits were $250,000. Exhibits 10,268-269. 
Nonetheless, after paying only $5,000 of the $250,000 benefits the Defendants intentionally stated 
to several of Weinsteins' medical provider creditors that Weinsteins had no more insurance for 
payment ofthe bills. Exhibits 83,84,111,121. Evenacursory look at Exhibits 83,84,111 and 121 
shows no reference or differentiation concerning "Med Pay" limits or remaining UM benefits. 
Instead, Defendants' statements clearly (and fraudulently) represent that the Weinsteins had 
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remaining insurance to pay the bills. Now after the fact Defendants try to manufacture an 
unconscionable argument that those letters refer only to Med Pay benefits, but the documents are 
self-evident. Further, there are no records or other evidence whatsoever that after sending Exhibits 
83, 84, 111 and 121 the Defendants ever attempted to either retract or clarify those benefit 
"exhaustion" representations or made any subsequent contact of any kind with those providers. 
Another example of Defendants' outrageous arguments on the issue of their reprehensibility 
is in their discussion about the numerous medical authorizations Weinsteins were required to 
provide. Defendants' conduct and claim records conclusively show they had no intention of ever 
using those authorizations for any purpose other than to simply delay and falsely lead the Weinsteins 
to believe that the UM claim adjusters "needed" the authorizations to evaluate and pay the claim. 
Defendants in fact argue, at page 34 of their Reply Brief, that all three authorizations were 
"necessary," supposedly justifying their three separate requests over a year's time. However, 
despite such claimed "necessity" Defendants offer no explanation why the first and second 
authorizations (both prior to Mr. Bistline's involvement) were neve* used or even exchanged 
between company claim adjusters. Defendants had literally done with the first and second 
medical authorization by the time they misled Mr. Bistline to believe they still needed an 
authorization a year later, yet Defendants argue that Mr. Bistline "blocked" and prevented them 
from securing Weinsteins' medical information (even under the third authorization provided 
through Bistline). The Defendants did nofhing with any of the three authorizations secured. 
Instead, Defendants misled Weinsteins by demanding all three authorizations under a purported 
urgent "necessity" to use them to investigate and pay Weinsteins' claim with no intention of actually 
doing so. 
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It is also outrageous for the Defendants to still contend that their $10,000 "advance payment" 
plan was not oppressive, unconscionable and outrageous under the circumstances. Defendants' 
adjuster and supervisor acknowledged that a UM committee came up with, in their words, this 
"plan" but argue, that it was a magnanimous "good faith" act. This Court will recall from the 
Weinsteins' initial brief that this "plan" first emerged just short of two years after the accident and 
did not colue forth because of any information not already accessible to Defendants for at least the 
prior year. Further, this plan was hatched contemporaneous with those same UM personnel 
reconfirming 100% UM liability and valuing the claim as high as $150,000. 
More importantly, the plan required Weinsteins to acknowledge that Defendants reserved 4 
rights, even the right to reverse course and contest UM liability. Because the Policy provided UM 
benefits only for damages Weinsteins were "legally entitled to recover" from the uninsured driver, 
Weinsteins' agreement to Defendants reserving 4 defenses would preclude any recovery beyond 
the $10,000 "advance" if Weinsteins failed to timely file suit prior to September 1,2004 (the statute 
of lin~itations would then legally bar any recovery against the uninsured driver). The offer thus 
effectively required Weinsteins to sign a release and give up rights just to finally get a small portion 
of their claim which Defendants acknowledged was worth some 15 times more than the amount 
tendered. The plan and release afforded the Defendants a new chance of buying Weinsteins' entire 
claim for $1 0,000 if the plan had worked to fruition. 
The offer in no way was a "good faith gesture" to "get some money quickly to the 
Weinsteins." The offer came way too late, nearly two years after the accident, which under no 
standard was "quick." The offer was grossly less than the undisputed value of the claim, and it 
carried a chance to escape any further payment on the claim. Knowing at that time the disastrous 
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consequences the Weinsteins had already suffered from the refusals to pay LIJY UM benefits for 
nearly two years, Defendants' offer was simply another tool to exert their economic strength to 
oppress Weinsteins. Defendants' continuing argument is shameh1 and ignores reality. 
4. The Court Did Not Err in Allowing the Amended Com~laint for Punitive 
Damages. 
This argument was previously addressed by Weinsteins in their initial brief, and those 
arguments are incorporated and reiterated into this brief. Ironically, Hall v. Fanners Alliance Mut. 
Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 3 13, 179 P.3d 276 (2008) ("Hall"), which Defendants cite in their constitutional 
arguments, puts this issue firmly to rest. As in Hall, the jury in this case in fact awarded punitive 
damages after considering competent and substantial evidence. In such instance, the trial court's 
discretion to allow a claim for punitive damages becomes moot. Hall at 321. 
5. Punitive Damages Do Not Violate Due Process. 
Neither the jury's punitive damage award, nor the Court's remitted punitive damage award 
violates due process, and it was error for the trial court to remit the jury's punitive damage award. 
a. Phillir) Morris Remand. 
Weinsteins do not specifically contend that the U.S. Supreme Court's withdrawing certiorari 
in Williams v. Phillip Morris USA, 549 U.S. 346, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 166 L. Ed. 2d 940 (2007) 
("Phillip Morris") was a decision on the merits that the case was correctly decided below. However, 
the denial of certiorari is not some hollow action. Only because of a very fine procedural 
technicality, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the 97:l punitive damages ratio notwithstanding 
the U.S. Supreme Court's prior remand on constitutional grounds. 
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not specifically consider the constitutionally 
"excessive" issue in its remand to the Oregon Supreme Court, the final result was a 97:l punitive 
damage award that, if the U.S. Supreme Court deemed "constitutionally excessive" merely because 
of that high ratio, could easily have been accepted again on appeal. 
Before Phillip Morris, both BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 
134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996) ("Gore") and Hall (at page 321) rejected the notion of a fine mathematical 
ratio in the constitutional context. Also, significant is the specific language of State Farm MuC. Auto 
Ins. Co. v. Cambell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1533 (2003) ("Campbell") which in fact did 
impose a strict single-digit ratio in all cases; Campbell stated only ihat, "in practice few awards 
exceeding a single digit ratio . . . to a significant degree will satisfy due process." Campbell at 425. 
The key here is that a single-digit ratio in cases may be the limit. That "single-digit" language 
is a stated guideline, but not a steadfast rule to control all cases. 
This Court's rulings in Myers v. Workmen's Auto. Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 95 P.3d 977 
(2004) ("Workmen's") and Hall are entirely consistent with Campbell, Gore and Phillip Morris. In 
cases like Workmen's and this case where the Gore "guideposts" are well supported, a high damage 
punitive damage award ratio is not constitutionally excessive; a lower ratio is appropriate when the 
guideposts are weak or partially non-existent. (See further discussion in the next section.) 
Weinsteins acknowledge that the Phillip Morris dismissal of certiorari does not establish 
that a 97: 1 ratio is constitutional, but if in fact such a high ratio is excessive per se, the U.S. Supreme 
Court could easily have retained certiorari in Phillip Morris and so ruled. 
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b. Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. 
and -
c. Myers v. Workmen's Auto. Ins. Co. 
Defendants criticize Weinsteins for not extensively discussing the details ofHall and instead 
focusing on Workmen 's. There is good reason for Weinsteins' focus, primarily based on the similar 
conduct and reprehensibility of Workmen's and these Defendants, as further discussed below. Both 
Hall and Workmen 's set forth comprehensive discussions of the constitutional issues relating to 
punitive damages. In Hall, this Court limited the punitive damage ratio to 4:1, but Workmen's it 
affirmed stand a ratio of 408: 1. The insurers' comparative reprehensibility in Hall and Workmen S 
was significant, and in Hall only one of the (Gore) constitutional "guideposts" supported the award. 
Therefore, the final punitive damage ratios are much different in Hall and Workmen's. 
Defendants' reprehensibility in this case admittedly falls between the degrees of 
reprehensibility of the Hull and Workmen's insurers, but is much closer to that of Workmen's. No 
matter how hard Defendants try to twist the truth, the facts and reprehensibility of the insurance 
company in Hull was nowhere near the degree of these Defendants or the insurer in Workmen's. In 
Hall, the court specifically determined that the insurance company's delay tactics although 
"inconsiderate, and perhaps even exploitive" were ''particularly egregious." Hall at 323. In this 
case, the Defendants' conduct was much more parallel to the despicable conduct of Workmen's. 
Defendants argue at page 36 of their Reply Brief that proof ofthe insurer's bad faith in Hall 
was "far stronger than what Plaintiffs present here." In exercising its free review on this 
constitutional issue (State v. Hedges, 143 Idaho 884, 886, 154 P.3d 1074, 1076 (2007), 
Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 320) this Court will see numerous key facts and determine 
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that the insurer's reprehensibility here exceeded that of the Hall insurer many times over, and in 
fact closely parallels Workmen's bad faith. Specific examples of the facts show: 
1. In Hall, the insured's damages related to real estate rather than their personal 
health and safety as in this case (in Workmen's the damages were only 
economic). 
2. In Hall, the insurance company began paying benefits about two weeks after 
the loss, only one day after investigating and ascertaining the initial extent of 
damages. However, in this case no policy benefits were paid until a small 
prescription bill seven months after the accident (Exhibit 72), followed by a 
few more almost a year after the accident (Exhibit 72). In Workmen's, the 
delay was even longer. 
3. The plaintiffs in Hall received a (second) substantial partial payment of an 
undisputed damage amount less than two months after their loss; in this case 
weinsteins had to  wait nearly a year for a mere $5,000 payment of 
undisputed benefits even though by then Defendants valued their claim at 
$25,000 (Exhibits 72, 73). Likewise, in Workmen's undisputed benefits 
were delayed and refused. 
4. The Hall insurer in fact investigated the property damage (actually 
commencing the evaluation of their insured's claim four days after the loss) 
and then & the initial undisputed claim amount (without any conditions or 
required release) less than sixty days after the loss; here, the Defendants did 
nothing to ever meaningfully investigate Weinsteins' UM claim for nearly 
two years after the accident (Exhibit 262), and eventually the unconditionally 
paid only a little more than half ($80,000) of their acknowledged $150,000 
claim value nearly two and a half years after the accident (only after being 
sued). Exhibits 283-284,267. In Workmen's, there likewise was no timely 
investigation or payment, 
5. In Hall, the insurer hired an independent engineering company and an 
independent adjuster to reinspect the home and reevaluate soon after the 
insurer first alleged additional damage; here, the Defendants did nothing to 
investigate or evaluate the claim, even completely disregarding the medical 
authorizations they had demanded and received from the Weinsteins. 
Likewise, in Workmen's the insurer ignored and failed to investigate and 
evaluate the insured's claim. 
6.  In Hall, the insurer's and insured's opinions of the claim value differed 
but insured (Hall) then refused to further deal with the insurer. The insurance 
company then successfully sued Hall to participate in the resolution process 
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specifically prescribed by the policy; in this case the Defendants sat back and 
simply refused the Weinsteins' repeated demands for payment of the 
undisputed medical bills simply because of their company policy not to pay 
undisputed amounts in advance of one final settlement. In Workmen's the 
insurer also refused to address the insured's demands or pay any undisputed 
amounts. 
7. In Hall, upon proceeding through the prescribed resolution process when its 
independent appraiser valued the loss in excess of policy limits, the insurance 
company promptly tendered its policy limits. In this case, even though 
Defendants (a) never disputed any of the Weinsteins' medical bills, (b) knew 
that the Weinsteins' damages were significant, and (c) valued Weinsteins' 
claim as high as $150,000, Defendants never tendered UM payment of any 
undisputed amounts without conditions until after they were sued. Even 
then, these Defendants took six more months to finally pay only about half 
the amount they acknowledged the claim was worth (Exhibits 283-284). 
Likewise, in Workmen's no policy benefits were tendered before litigation 
forced the insurer to pay. 
8. The Hall case was tried only on an alleged breach of contract and 
corresponding implied covenant of good faith (the trial court dismissed 
plaintiffs' claims under the specific tort of bad faith); here, the jury 
specifically found that Defendants committed the intentional tort of bad faith, 
which the trial court upheld on post-trial motions. 
To summarize the above differences in reprehensibility factors, in Hall the insurer acted 
with only minor "inconsiderate" delays investigating and evaluating its insured's loss. That insurer 
also paid initial undisputed amounts, promptly proceeded with a valuation resolution process when 
the parties could not agree, and then tendered the undisputed amount (full policy limits) soon after its 
independent appraiser evaluated the claim as part of the resolution process. As specifically noted in 
Hall, the insureds were "& injured to the extent that they did not a receive the whole of 
their insurance coverage." Hall at 323 (emphasis added). Like Wovkmen 's, the opposite occurred in 
this case-the Defendants simply stonewalled and refused to pay amounts, even though liability 
for payment of the Weinsteins' medical expenses and damages were undisputed. The Defendants 
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consciously and intentionally refused to undertake any payment investigation or evaluation of 
Weinsteins' claim and did nothing to actually pay UM benefits until after they were sued nearly 
two years after the loss. Defendant's conduct was a repeated reckless disregard for Weinsteins' 
health and safety,and financial vulnerability, imposed by deceit, and represented the highest degree 
of reprehensibility under Gore, Hall and Campbell. 
Despite all those facts, Defendants continue to wear their rose-colored glasses and blinders, 
arguing that the insurer's bad faith in Hall was "far stronger than what Plaintiffs present here." 
Exercising its free review, this Court can only conclude that the facts conclusively show that the 
Defendants' conduct in this case was indeed many times more reprehensible than the insurer's 
conduct in Hall, and much more like the Workmen 's insurer. 
Far from establishing any precedent for a reduction of the ratio in this case to 4:l or less as 
argued by Defendants, the Court's finding in Hall that the insurance delay tactics "were not 
'particularly egregious' in this case" (emphasis added) clearly demonstrates a recognition and 
affirmation of the most important constitutional "guidepost" of reprehensibility established in Gore. 
That same language in Hall implicitly recognizes that the ratio may exceed the 4:l rate upheld in 
Workmen's where conduct is highly egregious. Significantly, Hall did not indicate that the 408:l 
ratio in Workmen's was constitutionally excessive. 
In addition to the strength of the reprehensibility "guidepost" in Workmen's and this case as 
compared to Hall, this Court must also note that the second Gore "reasonable relationship to harm 
likely to result" "guidepost" was non-existent in Hall. The insured's damage in Hall was recognized 
as purely economic and easily quantifiable, simply based on the cost of repairing the physical 
damage to the property. Although Weinsteins' initial damages for their medical expenses were only 
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economic and easily ascertainable, their ensuing physical and emotional damages from Defendants' 
bad faith conduct were hard to define and the mone tq  value of their non-economic harm was 
difficult to quantify. As the court noted in both Workmen 's and Hall, the Gore case established that 
a higher punitive damage ratio is justified for the type of injuries the Weinsteins suffered. Hall at 
321; Workmen's at 509,s 10. Both Workmen 's and Hall also recognized and reiterated Gore's ruling 
that there is no constitutional line "marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that 
compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award." Hall at 321 ; Workmen S by its result. 
Returning to the Defendants' reprehensibility in this case, the harm suffered by the 
Weinsteins was physical, affecting their health and safety. Their harm was the direct result of the 
Defendants' intentional indifference and reckless disregard for Weinsteins' mental health and well- 
being, knowing full well that Weinsteins were financially vulnerable. Also unlike in Hall, the 
insurance companies' conduct in this case and Workmen's were repeated intentional actions over a 
long period of time, involving intentional trickery and deceit. 
Because of the degree of reprehensibility (the first and most important Gore "guidepost") 
and the reasonable relationship between the punitive damages and the harm resulting to the 
Weinsteins (the second Gore "guidepost") the jury's punitive damage award in this case is not 
constitutionally excessive. It follows, then, that the remitted amount is not excessive. This second 
"guidepost" was not supported in either Hall or Workmen's. 
As discussed in Weinsteins' initial brief, here and in Workmen's the civil penalty third Gore 
"guidepost" was fully supported by the insurers' conscious decisions to disregard the law which 
imposed specific penalties. Notably, in Hall this Court determined that neither the second 
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("reasonable relationship") nor third ("comparison to civil or criminal penalties") guideposts were 
met, and that even the first ("reprehensibility") guidepost was weak. The Court stated: 
Because only one of the guideposts supports the conclusion that the punitive 
damages award was consistent with the Due Process Clause . . . this Court confirms 
the district court's decision to remit the award to a 4:l ratio. While the "most 
important" guidepost lends some support to Hall's position, the Hall's support for 
the other two guideposts is nowhere close to being sufficient to meet the 
constitutional due process requirements. 
Hall at 323 (emphasis added). 
Thus the 4: 1 ratio in Hall was upheld based on only a, decidedly weak Gore guidepost. In 
Workmen's only two of the three Gore guideposts supported the award. Here, a11 three guideposts 
provide a solid foundation for the jury's award not being constitutionally excessive. There was no 
basis for the remittitur, and thus it was error. Thus the remitted amount of punitive damages is also 
constitutionally valid and in no case should be further reduced. 
Hall and Workmen's are both extremely relevant to this case in stating the law and providing 
excellent analyses of the constitutional punitive damage issues, but because of the extremely 
different facts of Hall compared to this case and Workmen 's, Hall is not an appropriate precedent to 
either uphold the trial court's remittitw of the jury's punitive damages or further reduce the trial 
court's remitted 9: 1 ratio. More appropriately, the court's decision in Wo~orkmen 's is a more realistic 
comparison and is a sound basis for upholding the jury's award and reversing the remitted punitive 
damages in this case, even though the compensatory damages awarded in Workmen's were a small 
amount. 
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CONCLUSION 
It was error for the trial court to have remitted the jury's punitive damage award, but even if 
this Court finds no such error the punitive damages should not be further reduced. 
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